cate with one another before or during the game. The most sweeping (and, perhaps, historically the most frequently invoked) case for Nash equilibrium theory in such circumstances asserts that a player's strategy must be a best response to those selected by other players, because he can deduce what those strategies are. Player i can figure out j's strategic choice by merely imagining himself in j's position. But this takes for granted that there is a unique rational choice forj to make; this uniqueness is not derived from fundamental rationality postulates, but is simply assumed. Furthermore, any argument suggesting that player rationality, combined with the structural characteristics of a game, inevitably renders all but one outcome "impossible," leads to conclusions that contradict widely accepted notions of "perfection" (Pearce [19] ). Once one admits the possibility that a player may have several strategies that he could reasonably use, expectations may be mismatched. Player i's strategy will then be a best response to his (possibly incorrect) conjecture about others' strategies, not the actual strategies employed.
A less ambitious defense of Nash equilibrium is that although equilibrium might not be attained in a one-shot game, players will eventually arrive at some Nash profile if the game is repeated indefinitely. Among the many objections to this claim, the most conclusive is that there may well be supergame equilibria involving phenomena (implicit collusion, maintenance of reputation, and so on) that are incompatible with single-period maximizing behavior. It is misleading, then, to study a repeated game by investigating the Nash equilibria of the one-shot game. But a more persuasive story can be told in which different players are involved at each iteration of the game. Each player is concerned only with one-period payoffs, but can look to the history of play for guidance regarding the likely choices of his opponents. While one cannot prove that each generation of players will follow a pattern set by previous participants, such an outcome seems quite plausible. But we are interested in analyzing many situations for which no precedents exist (such as nuclear wars between superpowers) or in which continual changes in relevant variables (technological breakthroughs, new legislation, and so on) preclude prediction based on tradition. It then becomes crucial to understand precisely what are the implications of players' information and rationality.
Most of this paper is devoted to the development and evaluation of a solution concept called "rationalizability."2 It is offered as an answer to my opening question: "What constitutes rational behavior in a noncooperative strategic situation?" No attempt is made to single out a unique strategy profile for each game; instead, a profile is rationalizable if each player has selected any strategy 2Rationalizability in normal form games was developed independently by Doug Bernheim [2] . The expression "ex ante equilibrium" which I used in earlier work [18] has been adandoned here in favor of Bernheim's descriptive term "rationalizability," in order to unify the terminology in the literature. Our papers are complementary in many respects, his analyzing more general games in normal form and comparing Nash equilibrium to rationalizability, and mine spending more time than his on the extensive form and problems of perfection.
that is "reasonable" in a sense to be made precise. A single player might have many such strategies.
While allowing for more flexibility than the Nash solution concept permits, one wishes to eliminate the problem of imperfection. This is complicated by the fact that there are actually two types of behavior that have been labelled "imperfect" in the literature. The first involves "implausible behavior at unreached information sets" and arises only in games having some sequential nature. The second is intimately related to the first, but can occur even in perfectly simultaneous games. It concerns the taking of risks that seem "likely" to be costly, when there are no offsetting advantages for a player to consider. The first type of imperfection can be ruled out on the basis of rather innocuous rationality postulates. Elimination of the second type, however, requires an additional assumption, amounting to the assertion that players will exercise prudence when it is costless to do so. Accordingly, I define two solution concepts. The first, rationalizability, relies upon little more than logical deduction, and ignores the second type of imperfect behavior. A narrower solution concept, which I call cautious rationalizability, makes the additional assumption needed to eliminate imperfections of the second type.
For expositional purposes the early sections of the paper deal only with normal form representations of games. Because I believe that the additional structure provided by the extensive form is often important in determining how players will act, I interpret a normal form game as a convenient representation of a perfectly simultaneous game, in which no one can observe any move of any other player before moving himself. Such games can be analyzed without the encumbrance of the extensive form structure. The analysis of Sections 2 and 3 should be understood as an investigation of a special class of extensive form games. Indeed, the general solution concepts ultimately proposed in Sections 4 and 5 reduce to those of Sections 2 and 3 for nonstochastic games in which everyone moves simultaneously. Many of the central themes of the paper come across more clearly in these special games.
RATIONALIZABILITY IN NORMAL FORM GAMES
The purpose of this section is to develop a solution concept for finite normal form games, based on three assumptions: ASSUMPTION (Al): When a player lacks an objective probability distribution over another player's choice of strategy, he forms a subjective prior that does not contradict any of the information at his disposal. Thus the operation R' is an iterative procedure; at each stage, a strategy is retained only if it is a best response to some conjecture over strategies (for other players) that have not been removed at an earlier stage. By Assumptions (Al) and (A2) each player chooses a best response to some strategy (/B1,... ., AN) rE fl= iMr; in the notation of Definition 1, i's strategic choice lies in MI(l).
Since this is an implication of Assumptions (Al) and (A2), which by (A3) are common knowledge, each player knows this information, and restricts his conjecture to elements of JIN l1Mr(l). Thus a best response of any playerj to his conjecture, is an element of M'(2). Again this is common knowledge, and t-fold iteration of this argument, for any t, establishes that strategic choices lie within the sets M l(t), . . . The need for players to randomize in many Nash equilibria has long been considered somewhat puzzling (see, for example, the discussion in Luce and Raiffa [14, pp. 74-76]. The incentive for randomization seems to be the need to "evade" one's opponents. But in the present context, opponents are not always able to figure out a player's strategic choice; such a player can hide without randomizing, camouflaged by the uncertainty of the other players.
The following definition and proposition provide an illuminating characterization of the rationalizable sets, without recourse to any iterative procedure. The principal drawback of rationalizability is clear: it typically does not allow a specific prediction to be made about strategic choice. (For example, in the game "matching pennies," all strategies are rationalizable.) But this indeterminacy is an accurate reflection of the difficult situation faced by players in a game. The rules of a game and its numerical data are seldom sufficient for logical deduction alone to single out a unique choice of strategy for each player. To do so one requires either richer information (such as institutional detail or perhaps historical precedent for a certain type of behavior) or bolder assumptions about how players choose strategies. Putting further restrictions on strategic choice is a complex and treacherous task. But one's intuition frequently points to patterns of behavior that cannot be isolated on the grounds of consistency alone. Formalizing this intuition in specific solution concepts would seem to be a matter of high priority; I interpret papers such as Harsanyi [11] to be in this spirit. 
CAUTIOUS RATIONALIZABILITY IN THE NORMAL FORM
The notion of an imperfect equilibrium was originally conceived (see Selten [20] ), and is still most commonly perceived, as a problem arising because of "implausible behavior at unreached information sets." This is obviously applicable only to extensive form games, which are treated in later sections. But a related phenomenon appears in normal form games, and has received some attention. In particular the paper by Myerson [16] on perfect and proper equilibria concerns exactly this issue.
Myerson's opening example is perhaps the simplest illustration of the problem at hand. G2 has two Nash equilibria. In the first, 1 and 2 select the pure strategies a, and .8 respectively. In the second, they choose a2 and 82 respectively. The latter equilibrium is, as Myerson indicates, counterintuitive: "it would be unreasonable to predict (a2, 12) as the outcome of the game. If player 1 thought that there was any chance of player 2 using /3I, then 1 would certainly prefer a," (Myerson [16, page 74]). It is clear that 1 is taking an unnecessary risk by choosing a2. He has nothing to gain by doing so, and possibly something to lose. The same applies to player 2, who would be foolish to choose 82.
Explanations of why a certain equilibrium is to be considered "imperfect" usually involve stories about players making mistakes with small positive probabilities. This is a departure from tradition in the theory of games, and one senses a certain reluctance in Selten's remarks: "There cannot be any mistakes if the players are absolutely rational. Nevertheless, a satisfactory interpretation of equilibrium points in extensive games seems to require that the possibility of mistakes is not completely excluded. This can be achieved by a point of view which looks at complete rationality as a limiting case of incomplete rationality" (Selten [21, Section 7]). The same reasoning is employed in normal form games, and Myerson concludes his commentary on the game G2 by saying that " . . . there is always a small chance that any strategy might be chosen, if only by mistake. So in our example, a, and .8 must always get at least an infinitesimal probability weight, which will eliminate (a2, 12) Roughly speaking, an e-proper equilibrium is a "combination of totally mixed strategies in which every player is giving his better responses much more probability weight than his worse responses (by a factor 1/e), whether or not those 'better' responses are 'best' . . . . We now define a proper equilibrium to be
any limit of E-proper equilibria" (Myerson [16, p. 78]).
Requiring, as proper equilibrium does, that when contemplating an opponent's "trembles," a player should give much higher weight to relatively innocuous mistakes than to those which would cause the opponent serious damage, suggests that one is interested in "sensible trembles." In other words, the idea behind proper equilibrium seems to be that a player should be open-minded about various reasonable alternative strategies his opponents might use; the random component attributed to an opponent's action must not be arbitrary. While it is important to insist that doubts entertained by a player regarding his opponents' strategies should be concentrated upon reasonable possibilities, proper equilibrium attempts to enforce this without reference to any theory specifying what possibilities are realistic. This explains the failure of proper equilibrium to rule out unreasonable choices in many games. One well-known example is presented later in this section.
I believe that the analysis of Section 2 provides the kind of theory that is required to determine what "reasonable doubts" players can rationally entertain regarding the choices of their opponents. For each game, rationalizability distinguishes those strategies that players could employ without violating the implications of the common knowledge they possess, from those that are patently unreasonable. If the condition that players do not take unnecessary risks is to be imposed by requiring that their conjectures give positive weight to all "likely" alternatives, those strategies that are not rationalizable should still be given zero weight. This constraint can be imposed by modifying the iterative procedure of the previous section, using the idea of a "cautious response." The solution concept performs as desired on Myerson's example G2, and the reader can easily verify that cautious rationalizability is equally appropriate when applied to another example (not given here) constructed in Myerson [16] , for which proper equilibrium also does well. But consider G3, the normal form of a well-known extensive form game (to be called F2) that is discussed in the next section. Notice that (a,, f82) iS one of the Nash equilibrium profiles of this game; in fact, one can show (ax1, f82) is both a trembling hand perfect, and a proper equilibrium. Why would 2 ever select /82? /82 is preferable to .8 only if 1 gives considerable weight to a3. But 2 knows that a3 is strongly dominated for 1 by a I, and will never be played. Thus, there is no risk to playing 8,, and a superior On the other hand, cautious rationalizability was formulated with games such as G4 in mind, where it singles out P, for 2, but respects l's legitimate indifference between al and a2 (given that 2's rationality is common knowledge, 1 knows that f2 will not be played). Bernheim's "perfect rationalizability" [2] is the natural extension of the "trembling hand" idea from Nash equilibrium to rationalizability. It is not equivalent to cautious rationalizability, which is motivated quite differently. In G3, for example, f82 is perfectly, but not cautiously, rationalizable. Conversely, in G4, a2 is cautiously, but not perfectly, rationalizable.
RATIONALIZABILITY IN THE EXTENSIVE FORM
This section generalizes the analysis of Section 2 to games having some sequential nature. In this context it is possible to study the best-known type of imperfect behavior, namely unreasonable behavior at unreached information sets. The problem is attacked using the idea of consistent conjectures, without the additional assumptions needed to ensure cautious behavior. Those perfect equilibrium. The set of perfect equilibria is a subset of the set of subgame perfect equilibria. As was noted in Section 3, the indiscriminate nature of the "trembles" allowed causes problems for the perfect equilibrium concept. The attempt by Myerson [16] to correct this by limiting the class of admissible trembles was only partially successful; proper equilibrium remains too deeply rooted in the stochastic "small mistakes" framework to escape all the difficulties created by that approach. A major alternative has been suggested by Kreps and Wilson [12] . Their solution concept, sequential equilibrium, is based upon an examination of rational beliefs rather than the possibilities for error.
While all of the solution concepts mentioned above have features that are extremely attractive, examples abound in which none of the equilibrium notions is satisfactory (one well-known example is presented later in this section). Equally important is the fact that they all admit Nash profiles only; this paper attempts to escape that restriction. Let us try to apply the idea of consistent conjectures to examples such as P1.
The possibility of collapsing series of choices into timeless contingent strategies must not obscure the fact that the phenomenon being modelled is some sequential game, in which conjectures may be contradicted in the course of play. In F1, it is ludicrous to maintain that if 2 is called upon to move, having been reached, he might choose f2, thinking that a1 was played by 1. By the time he must commit himself to a course of action, 2 knows that it is a fact that 1 played a2. The observation that a conjecture must not be maintained in the face of evidence that refutes it is a central element of the sequential equilibrium concept; it is combined here with a further principle and the iterative techniques of previous sections to construct a new solution concept for extensive form games.
Since of the form (mI, . . , mi-, /,m''i+l,  mN) , where mr' Hr(t-1), r = 1, .. ., N. (The eventual interpretation will be that at stage t of the logical deduction process, i knows that if he plays /, no information set IP' will be reached unless j E J (/, H, t).) A strategy a E H(t -1) giving positive  weight to pure strategies ax, . .. a. is an element of Hi(t) if there exist conjectures cJ7, z = 1, ..., h, such that for all z, and allj E J'(a, H,t The iterative procedure is interpreted as follows. At each stage, additional restrictions are placed on conjectures and actions only at information sets that can be reached by profiles of strategies not previously eliminated. In a particular play of the game, player i uses some pure strategy az which is a realization of the mixed strategy a. Condition (i) says that i's "conjecture" about his own strategy is correct. The next requirement stipulates that conjectures about others' strategies do not depend upon which of the a, . . ., ah player i ends up using.
According to (iii), a conjecture should not be discarded unless it is contradicted (by arrival at an information set unreachable by the conjecture in question). Condition (iv) ensures that a conjecture at Ii' explains how that information set could have been reached. The principle that the explanation should be "reasonable" is embodied in (v), which restricts conjectures to strategies that have not been eliminated at a previous stage. Finally, the strategy chosen by i should at all times be an optimal response to the conjectures he holds. The most convenient way to express this condition is to consider j-replacements for ao; these represent the options still open to i at I'J. Among these, ao must constitute an optimal contingent plan, given that beliefs about others' mixed strategies are described by cz' PROPOSITION 4: Under the assumptions of Definition 9, for all i and t, Hi(t) is nonempty, closed, and has the pure strategy property. Furthermore 3k such that Vi, H'(t) = H'(k), Vt > k. H'(t), i = 1, . . . , N, inherit the pure strategy property,   nonemptiness, and closedness from the original sets H'. This is easy to see in the  case of the pure strategy property, because if the pure strategies of which a mixed  strategy a is comprised can collectively satisfy (i) to (vi), each of the pure  strategies satisfies the conditions individually. To show nonemptiness, assume   H1(t -1), . . . , HN(t -1) are nonempty and closed, and choose any conjecture  c = (c(1), . .. , c(N)) such that c(r) E Hr(t -1) gives positive weight to every pure strategy in Hr(t -1). Since U' is continuous and H'(t -1) is nonempty  and compact, there exists an a that is a best response in H'(t -1) to 3 . a may be chosen to be a pure strategy, because H1(t -1) has the pure strategy property. 
PROOF: The sets

satisfy (i) to (vi). Thus /B E H'(t), and the set is closed. H'(t + 1) can differ from H'(t) only if for some j, Hi(t) # HJ(t -1)
. But since Hi(t) and Hi(t -1) both satisfy the pure strategy property, their convex hulls differ only if some pure strategy in Hi(t -1) is absent from H'(t). Thus, the iterative procedure "stops" in k steps for some finite k, because pure strategies are in finite supply. A more challenging test for the theory is an example that Kreps and Wilson [12] attribute to E. Kohlberg. (The example is robust: small perturbations in the payoffs will not alter any of the statements made below.) In the game F2, player 2 has only one information set, which is indicated in the game tree by enclosing the two nodes in that information set by an oblong figure. Notice that a I strongly dominates a3; the latter will never be played with positive probability by a rational player. If reached, 2 should conclude that a2 was played and respond optimally by playing,f1. Knowing that this would be 2's response, 1 should play a2. Despite this simple argument, another Nash equilibrium (which can actually be shown to be a trembling hand perfect, proper, and sequential equilibrium) has 1 playing a1 with certainty and 2 playing /2. This is not rationalizable. In the first "round," all strategies giving a3 positive weight are removed. In the second round, since these strategies are absent from M 1(I), 2 eliminates every strategy C(t -1)), ... ., RN(C(t -1)) Moreover, the set Q' of cautiously rationalizable strategies is nonempty, closed, and satisfies the pure strategy property V i.
The proof is a straightforward extension of the proof of Proposition 4, and is omitted.
The solution concept has the attractive feature that in the play of a game, no one's conjectures are ever contradicted. Since each person's conjecture gives positive weight to every cautiously rationalizable strategy of every other player, nothing that is believed by any player to have zero probability ever occurs, so long as others choose cautiously.
It might appear at first glance that in a game such as J4 in which 1 should be indifferent between a1 and a2 (according to subgame perfection or backward induction), cautious rationalizability forces 1 to choose a,, by eliminating a2 in the first round, before 2 has been removed. In fact this does not happen. Recall that before the cautious response criterion comes into play, the rationalizable sets are calculated. For 2, this eliminates all strategies except /,8; in "cautious response" to this, 1 plays either a, or a2. In response to the opening question: "What constitutes rational behavior in a noncooperative strategic situation?" an extremely conservative theory of strategic behavior, rationalizability, has been developed. Without attempting to predict behavior uniquely in all games, the solution concept rules out strategic choices on the basis of rather fundamental principles such as maximization of expected utility, and the common knowledge assumption. Rationalizability is well suited to dealing with implausible behavior at "unreached" information sets, but an additional assumption that players are in some sense cautious is needed to deal with a second kind of imperfection. Incorporation of this assumption results in a more restrictive solution concept, cautious rationalizability.
In conclusion, I wish to emphasize two points. First, as a necessary condition for a strategy profile to be reconcilable with the rationality of the players, the appropriate criterion is rationalizability rather than Nash equilibrium. Secondly, when one analyzes an economic or abstract game, every attempt should be made to exploit the informational structure of the extensive form, whether the objective is to make a specific prediction, or simply to place bounds upon what outcomes could possibly arise. M 1 and M2. a e M 1 is weakly dominated if and only if a is not a cautious response to (M 1, M) .
Princeton University
PROOF: Suppose that a is weakly dominated by some y E M1. Then for any x E M2 giving strictly positive weight to every pure strategy in M2, U'(a, x) < U1(y, x), so by definition a is not a  cautious response to (M l, M2) .
To establish the converse, suppose that a is not a cautious response. Define because / E W . Moreover the inequality is strict when x = (1/k, . l/k). Thus / is in W4 and yields 1 higher utility than /, against (1/k, . . ., l/k), a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
